In ‡ation targeting -the central bank practice of attempting to keep in ‡ation levels within …xed bounds around a quantitative target -has been adopted by more than twenty economies. Such practice has an important impact on the stochastic nature of in ‡ation and, consequently, on the pricing of in ‡ation derivatives. We develop a ‡exible model of in ‡ation targeting in which the central bank's intervention to steer in ‡ation towards the target depends on past deviations and the policymaker's ability or will to enforce the target. We use our model to price in‡ation derivatives and demonstrate the impact of in ‡ation targeting on derivative pricing.
Introduction
The global in ‡ation-indexed bond market has grown signi…cantly over the past decade as more governments and corporations have issued in ‡ation-indexed debt. As of 2011, the value of the global in ‡ation-linked bond market reached a total of $1.8 trillion. 1 Most of these bonds, such as those making up the US Treasury in ‡ation protected securities (TIPS) and French OATi market, guarantee a redemption payo¤ which is equal to the nominal par value and therefore include in ‡ation derivatives in the form of a put option. In addition, a separate market for in ‡ation derivatives has developed in the US, UK, and the Euro area. The payo¤s to these derivatives are linked to measures of realized in ‡ation, such as the US consumer price index (CP I) or the UK retail-price-index (RPI).
In this paper we propose a model for pricing in ‡ation derivatives that builds on the intuition of in ‡ation target regimes and that has the ‡exibility to capture di¤erent types of target regimes. In ‡ation derivative prices depend on the expected future path of in ‡ation, which in turn will be a¤ected by the presence of a target regime. Our model speci…cally considers how the dynamics of the in ‡ation process depend on speci…c aspects of target regimes such as speed and aggressiveness of central bank reaction to deviations of in ‡ation from the target. We extend the existing models of in ‡ation derivative pricing, which assume a standard geometric Brownian motion process for in ‡ation (following Black and Scholes, 1973) , or assume a meanreverting process (following Vasicek, 1977) and …nd that our model produces substantially lower pricing errors than either model. Developing a model for the stochastic process of in ‡ation in the presence of in ‡ation targeting is important given that such policy regimes have been adopted by more than twenty advanced and emerging economies (Roger and Stone, 2005; Heenan et al., 2006) . tools. The center of the interval or the speci…c in ‡ation rate targeted currently varies across countries from 1.5 to 2.5 percent per year. The target tends to be a constant yearly yield of the price index (target point) together with a target zone with …xed upper and lower boundaries between which yearly in ‡ation is targeted to remain. Some countries, such as the US, are claimed to be "covert in ‡ation targeters," who uno¢ cially try to target in ‡ation within certain boundaries (Mankiw, 2002) . 2 In ‡ation targeting has important implications for the pricing of in ‡ation derivatives. We illustrate this point by the following example: a European put option on the CP I, with one year to maturity and a strike price that is equal to the current CP I level, will never be exercised if the lower boundary of the target zone is equal to 1% and the target boundary is perfectly credible. Its price should therefore be equal to zero. In contrast, the price of an at-the-money put option evaluated using a standard Gaussian model, e.g. Black and Scholes (1973) , is positive.
As the example illustrates, the degree of credibility of the target zone has important e¤ects on in ‡ation dynamics. In ‡ation may deviate from the target or lie outside the zone for several reasons. First, there are lags between deviations from the target, resulting changes in monetary policy, and realization of the full impact of policy on the economy (Svensson, 1997) . Second, most central banks tend not to choose aggressive attempts to steer actual in ‡ation towards the target since they are trying to avoid reductions in growth and employment (Taylor, 1993) .
Third, the exchange rate, which may be hit by shocks, a¤ects domestic currency prices of imported goods, which enter into the CP I (Svensson, 2000) . It is indeed well documented that deviations from the target are not unusual from an international perspective. Roger and Stone (2005) …nd that advanced economies miss the target 52 percent of the time on average, and that the average length of in ‡ation exceeding the upper target zone limit is longer than the average time of deviations below the lower limit (8.8 and 7.3 months respectively). 3 2 In January 2012 the US Federal Reserve announced an o¢ cial in ‡ation target of 2% (see press release from 25 January 2012, http://www.federalreserve.gov). Previous to this announcement, the Federal Reserve's policy setting committee stated a desired target range for in ‡ation (usually around 1.5-2%).
3 There is also substantial cross-country variation in the average time of deviation from the target. While in Thailand and South Korea the rate of in ‡ation deviates from its target only 2% and 5% of We develop a general continuous time model for the in ‡ation process in which the central bank intervenes to keep in ‡ation close to the target. Central bank intervention depends on the economy's record of past deviations from the target. This record is captured by a state variable that accumulates the weighted average of past deviations. As the absolute value of this state variable increases, its e¤ect on the drift term and the di¤usion coe¢ cient of the CP I process increases. The e¤ect of each past deviation from the target zone on the in ‡ation state variable is a function of its distance from the present as well as the size of the deviation. The model can incorporate both strong and less aggressive policy reactions to in ‡ation deviations, and therefore di¤erent levels of in ‡ation target credibility. The model can capture di¤erent empirical aspects of the in ‡ation process that are typical for target regimes, where the credibility of interventions may be limited and deviations from the boundaries can occur.
We illustrate the e¤ect of our model on in ‡ation derivative prices and formalize the intuition of why in ‡ation dynamics in a target regime produce option prices that are di¤erent from those predicted by the Black and Scholes (1973) model. Numerical examples are provided in order to evaluate how the maturity of the contract, moneyness of the option, volatility of the CP I, and parameters of the model a¤ect the value of in ‡ation derivatives. We consider di¤erences in the speed with which policy reacts to in ‡ation deviations as well as policy e¤ectiveness.
Furthermore, we show that our model can match the volatility skew that is common in most in ‡ation derivative markets (that is, implied volatility is not constant across di¤erent strike prices).
Finally, we …t our model to market prices of long-dated US in ‡ation caps and show that the target model has lower pricing errors than the Black and Scholes (1973) , mean-reverting (Vasicek, 1977) , and two-factor stochastic volatility (Hull and White, 1988; Heston, 1993) models. Target model absolute pricing errors are low across di¤erent strike prices and for di¤erent maturities. Relative to Black and Scholes, our model cuts the total absolute pricing error almost in half. Implementing a simple mean reverting (Vasicek) model does not improve the time respectively, in Israel and in the Czech Republic deviations account for 94.4% and 76.2% of the time respectively (Roger and Stone, 2005) . pricing relative to Black and Scholes, while a stochastic volatility model results in a total pricing error that is similar to (though slightly larger than) the target model pricing error.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 relates the target model to the literature on optimal monetary policy, in ‡ation derivative pricing, valuation models for currency derivatives under target zone regimes, and macroeconomic factor models. Section 3 introduces the model and discusses how it can incorporate several di¤erent aspects of the stochastic process of in ‡ation under a target regime. Section 4 implements the target model numerically, compares target model and Black and Scholes (1973) prices, and discusses the intuition of patterns in model prices. We also analyze the ability of the model to explain variation in market prices. Section 5 concludes.
Related literature
Our target model is related to the wider literature on the reasons for the desirability of in ‡ation targeting. The seminal work by Kydland and Prescott (1977) points out the "time inconsistency"problem. In the context of monetary policy, the central bank may want to choose policy that results in a higher level of in ‡ation than expected by economic agents. This di¢ culty is a primary motivation for the appointment of an independent central bank (Rogo¤, 1985) . However, even an independent monetary authority may have a suboptimally high level of discretion and may be subject to political pressure (e.g. Meltzer, 2010 ). An in ‡ation targeting regime may enhance credibility and reduce uncertainty about future policy, thus anchoring in ‡ation expectations (Svensson, 1997 ). In our model we assume that the central bank has a certain level of credibility: it may respond strongly and quickly or implement less aggressive policy with longer delays (for example because of di¤ering relative weights on output stabilization and hitting the in ‡ation target). However, the model does not account for the case where the central bank's policy response function itself is time varying, for example due to increased political pressure during times of crisis, or the case where the central bank's in ‡ation target changes over time.
In ‡ation derivative pricing
We next brie ‡y review how our target model builds on and di¤ers from the existing literature on in ‡ation derivative pricing. Bodie (1990) …rst applies the standard Black and Scholes (1973) formula to price CP I-linked options by using a foreign exchange analogy as introduced by Garman and Kohlhagen (1983) . Real prices (in ‡ation adjusted) correspond to prices in foreign currency, whereas nominal prices correspond to domestic prices in local currency, and the CP I corresponds to the spot exchange rate and follows a lognormal process. Jarrow and Yildirim (2003) compute the price of CP I options when both the real and nominal term structures are stochastic by using a three factor model following Heath, Jarrow, and Morton (1992) . In their model, the price level process is exogenous and follows a log-normal distribution.
The assumption of log-normality for the dynamics of the in ‡ation index, though technically convenient, does not …nd justi…cation in markets (e.g. Mercurio and Moreni, 2006; Kenyon, 2008) . In fact, markets for in ‡ation derivatives exhibit a strong volatility skew or smile, implying that log index returns deviate from normality and suggesting the use of skewed and fat-tailed distributions. Ways to relax the assumption of log-normality include introducing stochastic volatility (Haastrecht and Pelsser, 2011; Mercurio 2005) or jump di¤usion processes (Hinnerich, 2008) . While such models provide an elegant and computationally e¤ective way for pricing in ‡ation derivatives, they lack a deeper economic underpinning. In contrast, our model re ‡ects the common practice of in ‡ation targeting while also capturing the volatility skew observed in the data.
Exchange rate targeting versus in ‡ation targeting
The approach of the foreign exchange derivatives pricing literature is also related to our target model. Speci…cally, in ‡ation targeting has parallels to foreign exchange target zones. To given an example, under the European Monetary System (EMS), a system of …xed exchange rates in e¤ect between 1979 and 1999 (previous to the introduction of the common currency), exchange rates could ‡uctuate freely only between a lower and an upper threshold. Such targets a¤ect the pricing of derivatives, in particular if their strike price was close to the boundary of the target zone.
We can classify exchange rate targeting models into two main categories and characterize their di¤erences by comparing the assumptions they make about the dynamics of exchange rates through assumptions about the drift (trend) and the di¤usion (volatility) of the process.
The …rst, based on the seminal contribution of Krugman (1991) , assumes that the target zone is perfectly credible; as the exchange rate approaches the boundary, the di¤usion coe¢ cient becomes small and the drift drives the process away from the boundary (see Larsen and Sorensen, 2007; Avriel, Bar Shavit, and Reisman, 1998; and Dumas, Jennergren, and Näslund, 1993) .
The second group of models incorporate the possibility of stochastic realignments of the exchange rate target zone, where the probability of realignment increases when the exchange rate is near a boundary (see Dumas, Jennergren, and Näslund, 1995; Svensson, 1993; Ball and Roma, 1993; Christensen, Lando, and Miltersen, 1999; and De Jong, Drost, and Werker, 2001) .
Although the models for pricing currency derivatives under target zone regimes may serve as a starting point for pricing in ‡ation derivatives, there are important di¤erences and thus these models cannot be applied directly. Deviations from the in ‡ation target are common (Roger and Stone, 2005 ) and therefore models with fully credible targets may not be appropriate. In addition, using a pricing model with the opportunity of realignments of the target does not re ‡ect the behavior of a central bank, since a deviation of in ‡ation from its target does not generally result in a change of the in ‡ation target itself.
Macroeconomic factors and derivative pricing
The paper also adds to the literature relating macroeconomic factors to in ‡ation derivatives pricing. Lioui and Poncet (2004) build a general equilibrium model of a continuous time monetary economy with an endogenous price level that is a¤ected by both real and nominal shocks. Belgrade, Benhamou, and Koehler (2004) examine the e¤ect on in ‡ation derivatives of developing a model that re ‡ects the empirical seasonality of the CP I. Bhansali, Dorsten, and Wise (2009) propose a nominal interest rate model in which the interest rate depends on the process of the output gap and in ‡ation, both following mean reverting processes around di¤er-ent target levels. They do not, however, use their framework for pricing in ‡ation derivatives; moreover, unlike our paper, their model does not take deviations from the target in ‡ation rate into account.
The target model
In this section we introduce our general pricing model for in ‡ation derivatives under an in ‡ation target regime. Our pricing model can account for di¤erent central bank reactions to deviations from the target as well as di¤erent degrees of control of monetary policy over in ‡ation. We can thereby capture the following common features that are typical to in ‡ation target regimes:
1. The existence of a "soft" ‡oor or ceiling. According to our model in ‡ation can breach the o¢ cially declared boundaries of the target zone. 5. The dynamics of in ‡ation can be mean reverting around the target.
6. The reaction functions below and above the target zone can be di¤erent (similar to Bhansali, Dorsten, and Wise, 2009 ).
As we present the model we refer back to the di¤erent aspects of the in ‡ation targeting regimes that our model is able to capture.
Our approach is to specify the stochastic process of the CP I and model the intervention policy of the central bank implicitly, similar to the approach followed by models for foreign exchange derivatives pricing (discussed in the previous section). Our model represents extensions of previously proposed models, which we now discuss brie ‡y in order to show why they do not capture speci…c unique characteristics of the in ‡ation process resulting from in ‡ation targeting. (Black and Scholes, 1973) The standard method for pricing derivatives on the CP I is to use the foreign currency analogy and to assume that the stochastic process followed by the foreign currency is the same as that of a stock providing a known dividend yield (Garman and Kohlhagen, 1983) . The drift of the foreign currency under the risk neutral measure is equal to the di¤erence between the nominal domestic and foreign risk-free interest rates. When modeling the evolution of the CP I, real prices (in ‡ation adjusted) correspond to prices in foreign currency, nominal prices correspond to domestic prices in local currency, and the CP I corresponds to the spot exchange rate.
Geometric Brownian Motion
Therefore, by analogy, the CP I has a drift rate of (r f t r rt ), where r f t is the instantaneous nominal forward rate and r rt is the instantaneous real forward rate.
Making the standard geometric Brownian motion assumption, the process for P t -the price at time t of one unit of the CP I -is of the form:
where p is the volatility of the CP I return and dW p is a standard Wiener process. Black and Scholes (1973) consider the pricing of derivatives for the special case where interest rates are assumed to be constant. (Vasicek, 1977) The standard process in (1) does not consider the existence of an in ‡ation target zone, in which the central bank establishes an explicit quantitative target. Under such a target regime the change of the CP I over a period should be located between a lower and an upper boundary.
Mean reverting
These boundaries are usually de…ned symmetrically around a central target (M ), such that in ‡ation over the speci…ed period (usually one year) does not deviate from the target by more than a certain percentage z. Denoting the accumulated in ‡ation rate as
we can write the target zone condition as:
If the central bank policy has a simple mean reverting e¤ect on the CP I, its stochastic process can be depicted by some version of the Vasicek (1977) model:
where the parameter > 0 governs the speed of adjustment and is positive to ensure stability around the target. However, such a mean reverting process does not ensure that in ‡ation stays within the upper and lower boundaries of the target zone.
Perfectly credible boundaries
In the context of perfectly credible …xed exchange rate regimes, De Jong, Drost, and Werker (2001), Larsen and Sorensen (2007) , and Avriel, Bar Shavit, and Reisman (1998) assume that when the exchange rate (or in our case the accumulated in ‡ation, X t ) is close to the boundaries (M z; M + z), the di¤usion coe¢ cient becomes small and the drift drives the process away from these boundaries. Integrating the Avriel et al. (1998) di¤usion coe¢ cient into the mean reverting process from (2) implies the following process for the CP I:
where
The di¤usion term reaches its maximum when accumulated in ‡ation is at the midpoint of the target zone (if X t = M , Y (X t ) = 1, the process is the same as the mean reverting case). When the process gets near the target zone boundaries the di¤usion coe¢ cient becomes negligible compared to the drift and thus the boundaries are perfectly credible.
An important assumption of the currency target zone models is the …xed range of the exchange rate resulting from the credible and predetermined boundaries: the exchange rate cannot lie above the upper or below the lower threshold. We next relax this assumption.
In ‡ation target zone model
We introduce the in ‡ation state variable F (t; X (t) ; M; z) which accumulates the history of deviations of in ‡ation from the mid-point of the target zone, M . The state variable a¤ects the drift of the in ‡ation process, which we assume to be equal to (r f t r rt ) + F (t; X t ; M; z).
When in ‡ation is above M , the state variable accumulates negative values and the drift is decreased, while the opposite is true if in ‡ation lies below M . This adjustment means that the CP I process reverts to the mid-point of the target zone. Speci…cally, the state variable is de…ned as:
Deviations of in ‡ation from the target are captured by the functions f (X t ) and g (X t ), which depend on the in ‡ation rate. The parameters 1 > 0 and 2 > 0 govern the relative weight of recent and past deviations from the target. The functions f (X t ) and g (X t ) are de…ned as:
where 2 > 1 > 0 and 2 > 1 > 0 determine the relative impact on the in ‡ation state variable of deviations above ( ) and below ( ) as well as inside (1) and outside (2) of the target zone.
By de…ning two distinct functions for positive and negative deviations from the target, we allow for the possibility of di¤erent reaction functions of the central bank in response to 'too high'and 'too low'levels of in ‡ation.
The severity or aggressiveness of the central bank's reaction to a unit increase in the deviation above and below the target M is represented by the parameters 1 and 1 respectively.
As 1 and 1 increase, the functions f (X t ) and g (X t ) become more sensitive to di¤erences between X t (in ‡ation) and M (target). The marginal e¤ect of deviations outside of the target zone is represented by the parameters 2 and 2 . If 2 > 1 and 2 > 1 , deviations outside of the target zone have a higher marginal e¤ect on the state variable than deviations inside the target zone, i.e. the central bank acts more aggressively to in ‡uence the CP I process in cases where in ‡ation has crossed the target zone boundaries than in situations where in ‡ation is within the target zone. When these parameters are set equal ( 1 = 2 ; 1 = 2 ), the central bank takes into account only deviations from the center of the target (M ) but does not take into account the target zone boundaries.
The in ‡ation state variable depends not only on the most recent in ‡ation rate but also on past levels of in ‡ation. The economic rationale for this assumption is that there may be lags between deviations of in ‡ation from the target and changes in central bank policy, both because it takes time for the central bank to change its policy in response to news about in ‡ation and because there is a lag between policy changes and e¤ects on in ‡ation. The e¤ect of in ‡ation deviations on the in ‡ation state variable can capture these dynamics: as the number of positive deviations increases the state variable decreases, while a series of negative deviations results in an increase of the state variable. Consequently, accumulated deviations result in a more pronounced change in policy and a subsequently larger change in in ‡ation through an increased speed of reversion to the target M .
The relative impact of recent and past deviations depends on 1 and 2 . Since both are assumed to be positive, recent deviations from the target zone have a greater impact on the drift than do remote deviations. However, when these parameters are set to zero, each past deviation has the same e¤ect on the in ‡ation target state variable; 1 and 2 are therefore decay factors that govern the relative weight of previous deviations of in ‡ation from the target.
High levels of mean that the in ‡ation process depends mainly on the most recent in ‡ation rate, while a low level of results in a close to equal weight of past deviations.
In addition to its e¤ect on the drift, the in ‡ation state variable also a¤ects the di¤usion of the process, as described in the following equation for the stochastic process:
The process allows for a higher absolute value of accumulated in ‡ation deviations (above or below the target) resulting in lower volatility. This ensures that large and extended deviations from the target result in more direct reversion back to the target. The parameter determines the magnitude of the e¤ect of the in ‡ation state variable on volatility. Higher levels of result in lower levels of volatility: that is, a higher level of e¤ectiveness of central bank intervention policy.
Summary of target model parameters
We now summarize the di¤erent target model parameters:
Strength of reaction to in ‡ation deviations. Higher levels of these parameters imply a higher likelihood of in ‡ation lying within the target zone or close to the target. E¤ects of in ‡ation deviations may be di¤erent within ( 1 ; 1 ) and outside ( 2 ; 2 ) of the target zone as well as for in ‡ation deviations above ( 1 , 2 ) and below ( 1 , 2 ) the target.
: Volatility of in ‡ation close to the target.
1 , 2 : Decay of reaction that depends on past in ‡ation deviations. Low levels of mean that the in ‡ation process depends on several recent deviations, implying a lag between past deviations and current levels of in ‡ation. High levels of mean that the process depends primarily on recent in ‡ation deviations. There may be di¤erences between deviations above
( 1 ) and below ( 2 ) the target.
: E¤ectiveness of reaction to in ‡ation deviations. High levels of imply that the volatility of in ‡ation declines with large past deviations of in ‡ation from the target. In this case reactions to past deviations of in ‡ation, in the form of changes in the in ‡ation drift, are more e¤ective at bringing in ‡ation back to the target.
Special cases
Our model can incorporate several previous contributions of the literature as special cases.
CASE 1: When 1 = 2 = 0 and 1 = 2 = 0 the in ‡ation state variable is equal to zero. The in ‡ation process is therefore no longer mean reverting. The model is reduced to the currency derivative pricing model of Garman and Kohlhagen (1983) , discussed above as the case of Black and Scholes (1973) .
CASE 2: When = 0 there is no e¤ect of the in ‡ation state variable on the di¤usion and if 1 = 2 t 1 the past in ‡ation history does not enter the in ‡ation state variable.
Instead, only the most recent level of in ‡ation is taken into account and the process is thus mean reverting. However, the mean reversion speed may be di¤erent within and outside of the target zone as well as for deviations above and below the target.
CASE 2a: A special case of the mean reverting process is if, in addition to the CASE 2 restrictions, 1 = 2 = 1 = 2 . In this case the target model is the same as Vasicek (1977) .
CASE 3: When t 1, and all the other model parameters are positive, the di¤usion term is negligible and the process is governed only by the drift term.
Pricing in ‡ation derivatives
In this section we use the target model to price in ‡ation options. We analyze prices of caplet and ‡oorlet (European call and put options) in the presence of central bank involvement and a soft target zone (as described in the previous section). We calculate option prices in the target model and analyze the e¤ect on option prices of changing di¤erent model parameters. We demonstrate that our model produces di¤erent patterns in option prices than the Black and Scholes (1973) model and discuss the intuition underlying these di¤erences. We also compare the ability of our model to match market prices and …nd that target model pricing errors are lower than in the Black and Scholes (1973) and Vasicek (1977) models and similar to pricing errors in a stochastic volatility model (Hull and White, 1988; Heston, 1993) .
Caplet and ‡oorlet prices
We consider caplet and ‡oorlet prices with varying strikes and maturities. A caplet is an option that provides a positive payo¤ if in ‡ation is higher than a pre-determined level, while a ‡oorlet pays o¤ if at maturity in ‡ation is lower than a pre-determined level. The standard payo¤ of caplets and ‡oorlets is in terms of the relative change of the price index from a reference date to maturity (in ‡ation over the life of the contract), compared to the level given by a …xed rate (strike price). At maturity of the option the payo¤s to in ‡ation caplets and ‡oorlets are equal to:
where CP I T 0 is the value of the CP I at time T 0 , CP I T is the value of the CP I at expiration T , and K is the strike price. The prices of the options are equal to the expected discounted cash ‡ows under the risk-neutral probability measure Q:
Calibration of target model prices and sensitivity analysis
In order to illustrate the di¤erent features of our model we present numerical examples of option prices. We compare target model prices using our model process for in ‡ation from (6) to Black and Scholes (1973) prices, which assumes the in ‡ation process from (1). Since there is in general no analytical solution for option prices in the target model we solve for prices numerically by calculating option prices based on Monte-Carlo simulations. 4 We assume that the in ‡ation rate before the valuation date was constant and equal to the target M , which we assume to be 2%. We assume that the distance between the center of the target zone (M ) and its boundaries is z = 1% so that the width of the target zone is 2%. This target zone is typical for advanced economies and exists in Canada, the UK, Israel, and Sweden. The volatility of the CP I yield is equal to 2%, based on the average rate of advanced and emerging economies. Options on the CP I are embedded in many long-term swap contracts; we therefore consider one and three year maturities, signi…cantly longer than the typical stock option. The risk-free rate is set equal to r f = 5%, the real rate is r r = 3%
and both are assumed to be constant. The target zone parameters are set to: 1 = 1 = 0:3, 2 = 2 = 0:6. We assume that = 40 (the e¤ectiveness of policy reactions to past in ‡ation deviations) and that 1 = 2 . We consider di¤erent levels of (the decay parameter governing the reaction to past deviations of in ‡ation from the target). Speci…cally we choose the case of equal weights ( = 0), an intermediate level ( = 3), which we refer to as the "base case,"and the case where only the most recent observation is taken into account ( t 1).
The parameters imply the following e¤ects: (1) The reaction of the central bank to a marginal increase in in ‡ation is twice as large for in ‡ation deviations outside the target zone than it is for deviations of in ‡ation located inside the target zone. The di¤usion term decreases as the in ‡ation target state variable increases ( > 0). The CP I value is normalized at time T 0 to one (P t = 1). Table I reports caplet prices according to the target model. We consider …ve strike prices chosen to be symmetric around the midpoint of the target (2%), 0:99; 1:01; 1:02; 1:03; 1:05 for a maturity of 1 year (Panel A) and 1:01; 1:03; 1:06; 1:09; 1:11 for a maturity of 3 years (Panel B). Since in ‡ation has a positive average drift we choose a higher set of strike prices for the three year maturity (if we assume that the drift is equal to 2%, we expect the price index to increase from 1 to 1:02 over 1 year and from 1 to 1:02 3 = 1:06 over 3 years). The strike prices in the table thus allow us to observe the e¤ect of our model on in ‡ation realizations within and outside of the target zone. We also consider two levels of volatility, 2% and 6%. In addition to prices calculated using the target zone model, for each strike price, volatility, and maturity combination we also report Black and Scholes (B&S) option premia.
Caplet prices
The main di¤erence between the target model and the B&S model is the relative likelihood of extremely high and extremely low realizations of in ‡ation, in particular in ‡ation levels that lie outside of the target zone. Such levels of in ‡ation will prompt central bank action resulting in in ‡ation moving back toward the target and back within the target zone.
Consequently, in the target model realizations of in ‡ation close to the target are relatively more likely than they are for B&S. In particular, the probability of high realizations of in ‡ation are lower in the target model, reducing the expected payo¤ of the caplet at maturity (and decreasing the price relative to B&S). Consistent with this intuition, B&S prices are signi…cantly larger for caplets with strike prices that are above the target. For example, the target model price of a caplet with strike price of 1:03 (and maturity of 1 year and volatility of 2%) is 0:18, far below the B&S price of 0:40. The lower target model caplet price re ‡ects the reduced probability of in ‡ation realizations above the upper limit of the target zone (1:03).
Caplet prices also depend on low realizations of in ‡ation, which are less likely under the target model. This e¤ect means that as the strike price decreases below the midpoint of the target, the di¤erence between target model caplet and B&S prices declines. The price of a caplet with a strike price of 0:99 is 2:84 (target zone), almost equal to the B&S price of 2:93.
E¤ects are similar for 3-year maturity options. The target model price is 4:40 for a caplet with a strike price of 1:01 and a 2% volatility, very close to the B&S price of 4:56. For a strike price of 1:09, for which realizations of in ‡ation above the target are important, the target model price is 0:05, much smaller than the B&S price of 0:42.
We also consider the e¤ect of a higher level of volatility. In both panels we report target model and B&S prices assuming that = 6%. As before, model prices lie below B&S prices and di¤erences are larger for high strike prices since, relative to B&S, the target model continues to result in lower probabilities of extremely high levels of in ‡ation. For low strike prices we now also see large di¤erences in price. The reason for this is the much higher probability of high (and above target zone) levels of in ‡ation in the case of B&S.
The in ‡ation deviation decay parameter ( ) also a¤ects caplet prices. We expect to have the strongest e¤ect on central bank policy for in ‡ation rates outside of the target since it is for these deviations that shifting the relative weights placed on di¤erent in ‡ation lags has the largest impact. Consistent with this intuition, caplet prices vary most across di¤erent levels of when the strike price is high, volatility is high, or maturity is long; that is, when caplet prices depend on the likelihood of extreme realizations of in ‡ation. Caplet prices tend to be low for the intermediate level of while they are higher for extreme levels. We will analyze and discuss this U-shaped pattern of caplet prices with respect to further in section 4.2.3.
Floorlet prices
As in the case of caplet prices, di¤erences in target model and B&S ‡oorlet prices result from di¤erent probabilities of extreme realizations of in ‡ation. Table II reports ‡oorlet prices for the same strike prices, levels of volatility, and maturities as in Table I Another di¤erence between target model and B&S prices can be the e¤ect that maturity has on ‡oorlet prices. The e¤ect of maturity can be ambiguous since there are two opposing e¤ects at work when maturity increases. First, if the CP I is expected to increase over the life of the contract (if in ‡ation has a positive drift), a longer maturity reduces the probability of the CP I lying below the strike price at maturity, thus reducing the ‡oorlet price. Second, as maturity increases, the volatility of CP I realizations at maturity increases, resulting in a higher probability of lying below the target and increasing the ‡oorlet price. The ambiguity in the overall e¤ect is re ‡ected in the B&S prices for a strike price of 1:01. If volatility is low (positive drift dominates), the ‡oorlet price decreases with maturity (0:38 and 0:10), while the price increases with maturity (1:86 and 1:88) if volatility is high (higher long-term volatility dominates).
In contrast, in the target model ‡oorlet prices decrease with maturity for both low and high levels of volatility. The reason is that in ‡ation targeting results in lower levels of long-term CP I volatility, making extremely low realizations of in ‡ation less likely than they are in the B&S model. Even if instantaneous volatility is high, central bank policy interventions will make it very unlikely that the CP I will lie far below the target zone boundary. For a strike price of 1:01 ‡oorlet prices decrease with maturity even for high levels of volatility, for which target model prices are equal to 0:77 (1 year) and 0:16 (3 years).
Valuation of ‡oorlets is important since most in ‡ation linked bonds include a capital protection guarantee so that the payo¤ at maturity is at least equal to the nominal face value of the bond. This is true in particular for long-dated ‡oorlets with low strike prices that are embedded in e.g. US TIPS, making di¤erences in out-of-the-money ‡oorlet prices across models signi…cant. A nominal guarantee translates into a ‡oorlet with a strike price of 1:00. In the target zone model it is extremely unlikely for the CP I to lie below this level after several years. For example, for a strike price of 1:01 the 3-year ‡oorlet price ( = 6%) is 0:16 while the B&S price is equal to 1:88.
We also …nd an e¤ect of , the parameter governing the decay of the e¤ect of past deviations of in ‡ation on current policy. As in the case of caplets, relative di¤erences in prices are larger for options that derive value from more extreme in ‡ation outcomes. The e¤ect of is thus larger for lower strike prices and for longer maturities.
To summarize, we …nd important di¤erences between model prices and B&S prices and intuitive e¤ects of target model parameters on model prices. We demonstrate that model prices better predict market prices in section 4.3.
The e¤ects of and
The e¤ectiveness of the central bank's policy in response to deviations from the target ( ) and decay of the e¤ect of past in ‡ation deviations on current policy ( ) are both important determinants of the in ‡ation process and are both innovations of our model compared to previous studies. We therefore brie ‡y examine their e¤ects on prices. We consider 1-year maturity caplet and ‡oorlet prices. The strike price is set equal to 1:02 (equal to the midpoint of the target zone) and the volatility is 6%. The other parameters ( and ) are set equal to their base case values.
Figures 1 and 2 plot caplet and ‡oorlet prices for di¤erent values of and (as before 1 = 2 ). Option premia are substantially lower for higher levels of . As the parameter increases, volatility outside of the target zone decreases. A high therefore reduces the probability of extreme and extended levels of in ‡ation outside of the target zone and option prices are lower. Tables I and II there is a U-shaped relationship between option prices and . Initially, as increases, the option price decreases since for a low level of the in ‡ation state variable depends on several observations in the past. In this case there is a signi…cant lag between in ‡ation deviations from the target and changes in the in ‡ation process. For example, even if the current observed in ‡ation is above the target, previous low levels of in ‡ation may mean that the central bank continues to pursue a loose policy that increases in ‡ation. As increases, the speed of the reaction increases and the process becomes more mean reverting due to a faster policy response. Correspondingly, option prices decrease.
Consistent with the patterns in
For high levels of option values start to increase again since the in ‡ation state variable depends mainly on the most recent deviation from the target. In this case the likelihood of several deviations above the target is higher than if the central bank becomes more aggressive in response to continued deviations from the target.
Fitting the target model to data
We now examine the ability of our model to match market prices of in ‡ation options. We use the target model to price US in ‡ation caps with di¤erent maturities and strike prices. An in ‡ation cap, the standard in ‡ation contract, is a portfolio of year-on-year (YoY) caplets, each of which is relevant for a di¤erent 1-year period over the life of the contract. For example, if the maturity of the cap is equal to 5 years and the strike price is 1:02, then at the end of each year during which the yearly in ‡ation rate lies above two percent the cap pays the di¤erence.
The price of the cap is thus equal to
where is the maturity of the cap. 5 We …t the target model to market data and then illustrate its ability to capture variation in cap prices by comparing in ‡ation cap market prices (from Bloomberg) to target model prices.
We consider cap prices for three maturities (5, 7, and 10 years) and …ve strike prices (1:00, 1:01, 1:02, 1:03, and 1:04). The set of strike prices is close to symmetric around the mid-point of the target and therefore represents the most liquid contracts. Cap premia are reported in Table III (Panel A) . Option premia increase with maturity; a longer maturity means that the cap includes more individual caplets. For example, as a percentage of par, a 5-year cap with a strike price of 1:02 has a premium of 6:28% while a 10-year cap with the same strike price has a premium of 14:93%.
Two other inputs necessary to calculate target model prices are nominal interest rates (swap rates) and zero coupon in ‡ation swap rates; we collect both data series from Bloomberg. We report the term structures of nominal swap rates and zero coupon in ‡ation rates in Table IV .
From the nominal swap rates we calculate spot rates (zero coupon rates), which we use to discount the caplet prices. From the zero coupon in ‡ation swap rates we calculate forward in ‡ation drifts (the di¤erence between the forward nominal and real rates), which we need in order to simulate paths for in ‡ation under the model assumptions.
The …nal input needed to calculate predicted prices in the target model are data on past in ‡ation rates, which are needed since the in ‡ation state variable depends on the weighted deviations from the target. We collect data on in ‡ation (changes in the CP I) from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and set the target equal to M = 1:75% (according to the Federal Open Market Committee, the implicit target zone is limited to the range between 1:5% and 2%). Figure 3 plots the annual in ‡ation rate from May 2008 to April 2010, the 24 months previous to the date at which we price the options, along with the mid-point of the target.
We choose a period of 24 months over which to measure past deviations from the target since the conventional assumption is that there is a 2 year lag between the enactment of monetary policy and the realization of the full e¤ect on the economy. We assume that the in ‡ation state variable is constructed using a weighted average of in ‡ation deviations over this period. 6
In the US there are no explicitly boundaries for the in ‡ation target zone. This means that 1 = 2 and 1 = 2 . In order to make the parameter space more manageable we also assume that 1 = 2 . The parameter space is thus given by ( ; ; ; ; ). We note that, assuming no di¤erence in the marginal e¤ect of in ‡ation deviations inside and outside the target zone means that the parameter z (the distance between the target and the boundary of the target zone) has no e¤ect.
We …nd model parameters that best …t the observed data. We implement a numerical search over a large parameter space using the sampling method proposed by Sobol (1967) . For each market price, we calculate the pricing error as the di¤erence between the market price and the model price, P M odel P M arket . For each set of parameters we then calculate the total absolute error:
The parameter combination that minimizes the total absolute error is: = 204, = 23, = 0:015, = 1:34, and = 3:63%.
Given that our model re ‡ects central bank behavior we can interpret the parameters: In ‡a-tion below the target results in stronger central bank reaction than in ‡ation above the target ( > ), consistent with a preference for a low probability of de ‡ation by the Federal Reserve. 7
These parameters are also consistent with forward in ‡ation drift levels above 2%, which are present in the in ‡ation swap data reported in Table IV . Also, in ‡ation is expected to be quite variable close to the target ( = 3:63%), but deviations from the target result in policy that ensures a return to the target ( is large). Lastly, since is large (the pricing error does not increase with ), the in ‡ation state variable depends mainly on recent deviations from the target.
longer maturities of the contracts we consider, the e¤ect of abstracting from this e¤ect will be small. 7 Williams (2009) points out that "Forecasters appear to be convinced that the Federal Reserve would not be content with sustained de ‡ation and would take policy actions to restore a positive rate of in ‡ation." Black and Scholes (1973) and market prices (Panel C).
Comparing market, target model, and Black-Scholes option prices
We report pricing errors (P M odel P M arket ) for each of the 15 options, and total absolute pricing errors for each strike price and maturity. The total absolute error of the target model is 4:1%, while the total absolute error for the B&S model is 7:7%, which means that using the target model results in a 47% decline in pricing error relative to B&S. We can also calculate the percentage absolute error by normalizing by the average option market price. The average absolute error is equal to 2:4%, while the B&S error is equal to 4:5%. 8 We report total pricing errors across di¤erent strike prices and di¤erent maturities. For each strike price and for each maturity the target model outperforms B&S. Given the intuition of in ‡ation targeting, we expect the target model to be important in particular for option prices that derive value from levels of in ‡ation with large di¤erences relative to the target. It is these prices that in the calibration analysis (Section 4.2) we found to have the largest di¤erences from B&S model prices. Consistent with those patterns, we …nd that the target model performs well relative to B&S speci…cally for caps with extreme strike prices: the average total pricing error is 0:65% for strike prices equal to 1:00 and 1:04 compared to a pricing error of 2:04% for B&S. As expected, the outperformance of the target model is smaller for strike prices that are closer to the target of 1:75%: Total target model absolute errors for options with strike prices equal to 1:01, 1:02, and 1:03 is 0:94%, closer to the level of 1:21% for B&S. The target model also performs better relative to B&S for longer-dated options: For 5-year options the di¤erence in error between the two models is 0:59% while it is equal to 1:82% for 10-year caps.
Another way to capture the ability of the model to match market prices is to calculate Black and Scholes (1973) implied volatility. Table V 4.3.2 Model prices when in ‡ation is mean-reverting Vasicek (1977) or when volatility is stochastic (Hull and White, 1988; Heston, 1993) We compare target model pricing errors to two additional models. First we consider, a meanreverting (Vasicek, 1977) model, which is a special case of our target model when imposing the restrictions that 1 = 2 = 1 = 2 , = 0, and 1 = 2 t 1. In this case the parameter space is reduced to ( ; ). A search for parameters that best …t the market data (Table III) results in a level of = 0, which reduces the model to the Black and Scholes (1973) Second, we implement a model with stochastic volatility. Following Hull and White (1988) and Heston (1993) we calculate model prices in a model where volatility is stochastic. In contrast to our model, the Hull and White (1988) and Heston (1993) stochastic volatility models are two factor models in which one stochastic process is used for the dynamics of the underlying asset (in ‡ation) and the second for the volatility of volatility. Speci…cally, the processes of the in ‡ation index and its return volatility are given by:
where dW P and dZ P are two standard Wiener processes with correlation , is the instantaneous standard deviation of
, and the mean reversion speed of the volatility to its long run mean, , is denoted by .
We implement the model assuming that the current level of volatility is equal to its long run mean. We then search for parameters that minimize the total absolute pricing error, which we …nd to be equal to 4:74%. The stochastic volatility model thus results in a substantially lower pricing error than the Black and Scholes (1973) and Vasicek (1977) models (both 7:7%) and is only slightly larger than the target model pricing error of 4:1%. 9 Our proposed target model therefore has the bene…t of incorporating the intuition of in ‡ation targeting while not su¤ering from a decline in pricing accuracy compared to other models.
Conclusion
In this We use our model to price in ‡ation options. Di¤erences between target model and Black and Scholes (1973) prices are high in particular for options that are sensitive to extreme realizations of in ‡ation. For example, prices of high strike price caplets are signi…cantly smaller than B&S prices because the probability of very high levels of in ‡ation is much lower when taking into account the reaction of the central bank. Long-dated ‡oorlet prices with low strike prices have lower prices in the target model (as compared to B&S), since continued levels of low in ‡ation are less likely given central bank intervention. Since low-strike long-dated ‡oorlets 9 We implement the stochastic volatility model as follows: Following Broadie and Kaya (2006) we simulate a path for volatility and then use the Hull and White (1988) approximation to calculate the value of each forward starting caplet that is part of the cap. We note that several other authors including Van Haastrecht and Pelsser (2010) and Kahl and Jackel (2006) have also contributed towards developing e¢ cient discretization schemes for the Heston (1993) model. are embedded in e.g. TIPS, the price di¤erences take on added importance.
Fitting our model to US in ‡ation caps we …nd that the target model is able to reduce the pricing error of the B&S model by close to 50%. Predicted prices are more accurate for all strike prices and maturities. Consistent with the target model being better able to predict extreme events, the outperformance of the model relative to B&S is largest for longer-dated options and for options with strike prices outside of the target zone. Note. This table presents the value of caplets (as percentage of notional amount) for various strike prices. The CPI is normalized to 1 and the time to maturity is equal to one year (Panel A) and three years (Panel B). The nominal interest rate is fixed and equal to r f =5%, the real rate is set equal to r r =3%, the volatility of the CPI is equal to σ=2% or σ=6%. The midpoint of the inflation target zone is 2%, the target zone is symmetric around the midpoint with a range between the midpoint and the boundary of z=1%, and inflation is equal to the target previous to the valuation date. Inflation state variable parameters are given by: =40, γ 1 =δ 1 =0.3, γ 2 =δ 2 =0.6. The time decay parameters β 1 and β 2 are set equal to 0, 3, and ∞. Note. This table reports market prices (Panel A) and differences between market prices and model prices (Panels B and C) for US CPI inflation caps. Prices are reported as a percentage of notional, for various strike prices and maturities; prices are from April 30, 2010; the data source is Bloomberg. Panel B reports differences between target model and market prices as well as total absolute errors (TAE) for each group of strike prices and maturities. The parameters for the target model are: , ,    ,      and     Panel C reports differences between Black and Scholes (1973) model and market prices. Volatility is set equal to . Inflation and interest rate data are reported in Table 4 and Figure 3 . Note. This table reports the term structure of US nominal interest rate swap rates and the term structure of zero coupon (ZC) inflation swap rates for April 30, 2010. The data are used to calculate option premia (see Table 3 ). The data source is Bloomberg. 
Figure 1

Caplet valuation for different values of the model parameters and 
This figure graphs caplet prices for different levels of . The parameter determines the effect of past deviations from the target on the process of inflation (central bank memory). The parameter  determines the rate of decrease of the diffusion term with respect to an increase in the absolute value of the inflation target state variable (policy effectiveness). We set it equal to 0, 40, and 200. Inflation volatility is equal to 6%, the maturity is 1 year, and the strike price is 1.02. All other parameters are equal to their base case values. 
Figure 2
Floorlet valuation for different values of model parameters and 
This figure graphs floorlet prices for different levels of . The parameter determines the effect of past deviations from the target on the process of inflation (central bank memory). The parameter  determines the rate of decrease of the diffusion term with respect to an increase in the absolute value of the inflation target state variable (policy effectiveness). We set it equal to 0, 40, and 200. Inflation volatility is equal to 6%, the maturity is 1 year, and the strike price is 1.02. All other parameters are equal to their base case values.
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